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Abstract 
In this paper, the concept of possibilistic ev­
idence which is a possibility distribution as 
well as a body of evidence is proposed over 
an infinite universe of discourse. The in­
ference with possibilistic evidence is investi­
gated based on a unified inference framework 
maintaining both the compatibility of con­
cepts and the consistency of the probability 
logic. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Dempster-Shafer's theory of evidence (Dempster 
1 967, Shafer 1 976) the concept of basic probability as­
signment captures the idea that probabilities should 
be distributed on subsets of the universe of discourse. 
A basic probability assignment is obtained instead of 
a classical probability because of the lack of statistics 
or lack of full knowledge in expert estimations on all 
the singletons in the universe of discourse. This lack of 
knowledge is called ignorance (Smets 1 991). Ignorance 
exists universally in the real world. 
In practice, it is frequently impossible to carry out 
statistics directly in order to describe randomness. 
Even when statistics can be carried out, the number 
of samples may not be sufficiently large. Estimations 
from experts are often required or used to estimate 
uncertainties. Usually, experts cannot provide prob­
ability distributions or basic probability assignments 
based on their expertise to estimate randomness. And 
the expert estimations of random events are usually 
expressed in natural language propositions. Following 
is an example: 
Example: Suppose that an expert based on his ex­
perience and observation estimates that a particular 
target shooter should be "very accurate". The num­
bers of the rings actually shot may be 10, 9, 8, ... , it is 
random. The estimation of the expert can be formu­
lated as a proposition: 
p � "The ring number shot (X)" is "very accurate (F)"; 
i.e. 
b. . -p=XlsF, X E 8. 
Here, the expert uses the concept "very accurate" to 
estimate the randomness of the rings actually shot. 
How the ring numbers 10, 9, 8, . . .  , are compatible with 
the concept "very accurate" is fuzzy. Furthermore, 
the concept "very accurate" must contain some infor­
mation on the randomness of the ring numbers shot. 
The question is whether it is possible to extract some 
information on the probability of the actual ring num­
bers that will be shot from the fuzzy proposition. We 
believe that there should exist some connection be­
tween the two kinds of uncertainties: the randomness 
of events and the fuzziness of concepts which are used 
to estimate the randomness. Although the expert's 
estimation may have come from statistical experience 
and observation, but it is not sufficient to specify a 
basic probability assignment. As a result, he can only 
use language concepts which have fuzzy membership 
functions in his mind to describe his estimation of the 
outcome of a random event. Our goal is to extract 
as much information as possible from propositions ex­
pressed in a natural language. 
The above proposition in the example is called a pos­
sibility proposition in Zadeh's possibility theory (see 
(Zadeh 1 978, 1 979) etc.). In the possibility theory, 
the most important interpretation for the possibility 
is the compatibility of the value a language variable 
(X) takes with a fuzzy concept. Zadeh pointed out 
that there exists the following relation: 
Probability:::; Possibility 
However, there should exist tighter and deeper con­
nections between the possibility and the probability 
when the possibility proposition is used to estimate 
the outcome of random events. In a possibility propo­
sition, the values taken by the language variable (X) 
constitute a possibility distribution which is a fuzzy 
subset, i.e. F in the proposition is a fuzzy set. In the 
theories of random subset coverage or falling shadow 
proposed by Goodman (Goodman 1 982, 1 991) and 
Wang (Wang 1983, 1985), it has been discovered that 
a fuzzy subset can be represented as the coverage or 
the falling shadow of a random subset, i.e. the mem­
bership function of a fuzzy subset, Jl.jo(B) can be ex-
pressed as the coverage or the falling shadow function 
of a random subset, J.Le(8). Combining the theories 
in (Goodman 1 983, 1 991 , Wang 1 983, 1 985) with the 
Dempster-Shafer's evidence theory, it can be shown 
that, in fact, J-te( 8) is the plausibility function on sin­
gletons, Ple(8), 8 E e, i.e. J-tp(8) = J-te(8) = Ple(8). 
Therefore, we believe that if the fuzzy subset F in the 
possibility proposition is used to estimate the outcome 
of a random event, F must contain implicitly a certain 
amount of information on a (generalized) probability 
distribution, i.e., a basic probability assignment. 
The information provided by a fuzzy subset F through 
its membership function is, however, only limited to 
the plausibility function on singletons. Unfortunately, 
a basic probability assignment cannot be determined 
uniquely by the plausibility on singletons. There exist 
many basic probability assignments whose plausibili­
ties on singletons of the universe of discourse are the 
same. A rational method is needed to select a ba­
sic probability assignment from those having the same 
plausibility function on singletons to express the infor­
mation of randomness contained in the fuzzy subset F. 
The selection should be able to reflect the amount of 
ignorance in a basic probability assignment. In (Song 
and Liang et.al 1 988, 1 990,1 992, 1 993) , we proposed the 
concept of possibilistic evidence. Possibilistic evidence 
is a possibility distribution ( i.e. a fuzzy subset) as well 
as a body of evidence ( i.e. a basic probability assign­
ment) . 
More important problems occur in inference. U su­
ally, in a decision making process, the information 
on randomness provided by experts' estimations can­
not support the decision conclusion directly and infer­
ence is necessary. The inference required is different 
from fuzzy inference because the probability implica­
tion must be considered at all steps, while fuzzy infer­
ence only concerns with the compatibility of concepts. 
Of course, since the information estimating random­
ness is represented in natural language concepts, the 
inference should also be consistent with the compati­
bility of concepts. 
This paper investigates the following two problems: 
1) Extend the concept of possibilistic evidence to an 
infinite universe of discourse and remove the limita­
tion that the possibility distributions should be nor­
mal fuzzy subsets in (Song et aL 1988, 1 990,1 992) . The 
measurability of set-valued mappings will be included 
in the consideration. 
2) Develop a unified framework of logic inference with 
possibilistic evidence. In this framework both the com­
patibility of concepts and the probabilistic logic should 
be maintained consistently in inference. This will en­
able us to gain a better understanding of the connec­
tion in inference between the two kinds of uncertain­
ties, randomness and fuzziness. A variety of different 
kinds of fuzzy operators and probability relations can 
be investigated systematically to reveal the underly-
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ing relation between fuzzy inference and probabilistic 
inference. 
2 POSSIBILISTIC EVIDENCE 
To extend the evidence theory to an infinite universe 
of discourse, we define a super-measurable structure 
on the universe of discourse for the measurability of 
set-valued mappings. 
Definition 2.1(The super-measurable structure) : Let 
e be the universe of discourse (frame of discernment) , 
either finite or infinite, and P(e) be the power space 
consisting of all the subsets of e ( including the empty 
set 0 and e itself) . Let .C C P(e) be a subclass of 
subsets of e, which contains .Co = {{8}!8 E e} , the 
subclass of all the singleton subsets of e. Let B be 
a u-algebra generated by .C over e. In addition, for 
each B E .C, define a £B-type subclass of subsets as 
£B = {E!E E B, En B =f. 0}. Let B be the u-algebra 
generated in B by the collection of £B's for all BE .C. 
Furthermore, the u-algebra B should have the follow­
ing property: &B E B implies £13 E B, where B is 
the complement of B in e. Then (B, B) is called a 
super-measurable structure over e. 
Usually, in addition to .C0, .C should include other sub­
sets in e. For example, if e is at most countable, it 
is sufficient to have .C = .C0, and B will contain the 
collection of all Borel sets. But if e is not countable, 
.c should include all the open (or closed) subsets in e 
so that B contains the collection of all Borel sets. 
Definition 2.2 A measurable mapping, e : 0 ---+ B, 
from a probability field (0, A, P) to (B, B), satisfying 
e-1(C) = {w!e(w) E C} E A, for all c E B, is called a 
random subset over the universe of discourse e. The 
set of all the random subsets over e is denoted as 
S(A, B). 
If a measurable random subset e : 0 ---+ B makes 
P{w!e(w) E B, w E 0} = 1 and K(e) = P{w!e(w) =f. 
0, w E 0} > 0, then e is called a basic probability as­
signment over e. All the basic probability assignments 
constitute a subclass ofS(A, B), denoted as Sm (A, B). 
Proposition 2.3: If e : 0 ---+ B is a basic probability 
assignment, then {w!e(w) =f. 0,e(w) c A , w E 0} and 
{w!e(w) ::::> A,w E 0} all belong to the u-algebra A 
for all A E B. Therefore the following functions are 
well-defined for each subset C c e (ref. (de F eriet 
1 982)) : 
Bele (C) = K-1(e) sup P{w!0 =f. e(w) C A , w E 0} 
ACC,AEB 
is called a belief degree (belief function}; 
Pie( C)= 1 - Bele (C) 
is calle9- a plausibility degree (plausibility function), 
where cis the complement of cine. 
Qe(C) = sup P{w!e(w) ::::>A, wE 0} A:::>C,AEB 
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is called a commonality number (commonality func­
tion). 
In a finite universe of discourse and if K(f.) = 1, the 
above definitions coincide with the original definition 
in (Shafer 1976). According to Shafer's definitions, 
P l (C) and Bel (C) are respectively the optimistic and 
the conservative estimations of the probabilities as­
signed to subset A, where A represents a crisp propo­
sition. And Q( C) measures the probabilities that can 
move freely to every point of A (see (Shafer 1976)). 
Next, we present some concepts in possibility theory to 
prepare the ground for the investigation of the relation 
between the evidence theory and the possibility theory. 
Definition 2.4: Let F>. = {OIJLi'(O) � ..\, 0 E e}, 0 < 
..\ < 1, be the ..\ - subset of a fuzzy subset F. A 
fuz-;y subset F is called as a B-measurable one, if all 
its ..\ - subsets F>. E B. 
We will simply call B-measurable as measurable. Only 
measurable fuzzy subsets will be considered in this pa­
per. 
In Zadeh's possibility theory (Zadeh 1978, 1979), pos­
sibility and necessity measure are defined as 
IIp(C) = Poss{X E A}= sup Jlp(O),O E e; 
IlEA 
Np(C) = 1- Poss{X E A}= 1- SUPJlp(O),O E e. 
IlEA 
These definitions are only suitable for normal fuzzy 
subsets (i.e. F1 =/= 0, implying sup9EE> Jlp(O) = 1). 
Otherwise, for some A c e, there may be IIp(C) < 
N p(C), yielding a contradiction. Therefore we rede­
fine them as 
Definition 2.5 
IIp(C) = 
supeEc Jlp(O)' N p(C) = 1-
supiiEC Jlp(O); supiiEE> Jlp(O) supiiEE> Jlp(O) 
and 
Qp(C) = Jrf:JLp(O) 
where Qp(C) is the commonality number (commonal­
ity function) of F. 
We use the falling shadow or coverage function of ran­
dom subsets as a tool to explore the connection be­
tween the evidence theory and the possibility theory. 
The formal definition of a falling shadow or coverage 
function of a random subset is given below. 
Definition 2.6: Assume f. : 0 --+ B is a basic proba­
bility assignment over e. Define 
JLe(O) = P{wlf.(w) 3 0, w E 0}, 0 E e. 
JLe(O) is called the falling shadow or coverage function 
of e. 
From Definition 2.1 and 2.2, it is certain that JLe(B) 
exists for all 0 E e. 
It can be proved that, for a fuzzy subset F, there exists 
a falling shadow (or coverage) function of random sub­
sets JLe(O) representing its membership function P,p(B), 
and this correspondence is many-to-one. We have 
Definition 2. 7 e/ ,.., is called an equivalent subclass 
of falling shadow (or coverage) of random subsets for 
a (measurable) fuzzy subset F, if it consists of all 
the (measurable) random subsets having the following 
properties: if f. E f./"", then 
JLe(B) = Jlp(O), 0 E e, and K(f.) =sup P,p(B). 
DEE> 
Under certain mathematical assumption (see As­
sumption 2.11) , we can prove that an equivalent sub­
class of falling shadow (or coverage) is not empty and, 
in general, it contains more than one random subset . 
We have 
Theorem 2.8 (The fundamental theorem of possi­
bilistic evidence): There exists a f.o E f./ "", whose 
images in e are ..\-subsets of F' F{ s, moreover, for all f. E f./"", there are 
and 
IIp(C) = Pleo(C)::; Ple(C); 
N p(C) = Bele0(C) � Bele(C) 
Qp(C) = Qeo(C) � Qe(C) 
for all C c e. Therefore f./,.., can be denoted as f.o/ ""· 
Note: The condition K(f.) = sup9EE> Jlp(O) can be 
removed for the third inequality. 
The basic probability assignment f.o : 0 --+ B and 
the corresponding belief, plausibility and commonal­
ity functions are altogether called the possibilistic ev-
idence induced from the possibility proposition p � 
X is F,X E e. 
From Theorem 2.8, we can conclude that the choice 
of the possibilistic evidence from the equivalent sub­
class of falling shadow (or coverage) of random subsets 
induced by the possibility distribution F assures that 
the maximum amount of information on randomness 
from the possibility proposition is extracted. This is 
based on the belief that the language proposition con­
tains valuable information of expert knowledge esti­
mating randomness. 
The following definitions are needed to investigate the 
inference of possibilistic evidence. 
Definition 2.9: Suppose (0, A, P) is a probability 
field, a A -division over 0 is defined as a subclass of 
subsets of 0: d = {D;Ii E I}, where I is at most 
countable, satisfying 
D; E A (i E I), U D; = 0, D; n Di = 0, for i =/= j. 
iEI 
The collection of all A-division over 0 is denoted as 
1J = 1J(O, A). The normal net of (0, A, P) is a division 
series 1)* = { d(n)} C 1J(O, A) : 
d(n) = {D;1 ... inlik = 0, 1, k = 1, ... ,n}, 
1 Di1 ... i,. E A, P(Di1 ... i,.) = 2n, 
Di1 ... i,._1o U Di1 ... i,._1  = Di1 ... i,._1; n = 1, 2, ... 
Definition 2.10: A is said to be sufficient to B, if 
Projo.(A x B) � {Projo.DID E A x  B} = A, where 
Projo.D � {wl38 E e: (w,8), ED} is the projection 
of D into 0. 
We assume that all the probability fields in this paper 
satisfy the following assumption: 
Assumption 2.11 The probability field (0, A, P) has 
its fixed normal net and A is sufficient to B. 
3 INFERENCE WITH 
POSSIBILISTIC EVIDENCE 
3.1 NEGATION, SYNONYMOUS AND 
ANTONYMOUS CLASSES OF 
CONCEPTS 
Definition 3.1.1: e :  0-+ B is a set-valued mapping, 
and 
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It is obviously that fn(8) = P(G�)I.e). If n1 < nz, 
then a(n1) c a(n2) Let G*- = limn_.oo aC::) = F F . F F 
U�=1 G�). This assures that Gft. E A x B and 
J.lp(8) = P (Gj.l.e) . The possibilistic evidence in The­
orem 2.8 can be obtained using the Gfr.: 
Proposition 3.1.4: Let eo(w) = Gj;.l·w ' then eo :  0-+ 
B is the possibilistic evidence of Theorem 2.8. 
It is obvious that Gj;. is the graph of eo, i.e., Gj;. = 
{(w, 8)leo(w) 3 8}. 
Let Ge = (0 X e)fGe and ((w) = Gel·w, then e is 
called the complement of e. If e E e/ ,...., in Definition 
2.7, We have 
Proposition 3.1.5: ( : 0 -+ B is a (measurable) 
random subset with its falling shadow ( O_!' coverage) 
J.l€(8) = 1- J.lp(8) = J.l;.(8), 8 E e. Then e represents 
the fuzzy subset F, the complement of the fuzzy subset 
F, i.e. it represents the negation proposition -.p � 
X is (not F)' X E e. The operation e -+ e is called 
negation. 
Ge � {(w,8)ie(w) 3 8 } It is obvious that e = e. Morever, there is 
is called the graph of e. Theorem 3.1.6: If eo is the possibilistic evidence 
Lemma 3.1.2: Let in the equivalent subclass induced from F, D ,...., is 
t::.. the equivalent subclass of falling shadow (or cover-e(w) = Gl.w, where Gl.w = {8l(w, 8) E G}, and G E AxB, ) · d d f F"' · fi II c E c; th age In uce rom , I.e., or a ., ., "', ere 
then e :  0-+ B is a (measurable) random subset. is J.l€(8) = J.lp(8) = 1- J.lp(8) ,8 E e, and K(() = 
Definition 3.1.3: G E A X B, Gl.e = {wl(w, 8) E G} SUPeee wp(8) = 1.- i�feee J.lp(8): . rr:h�n (o,, induc�d 
is called the cutting shadow of Gat 8. :from eo by nega0on,_IS the possibihstiC evidence Ill 
IfF is a measurable fuzzy subset, then its membership 
function J.l p is a (B-) measurable real function. There­
fore, there exists a sequence of (B-) simple functions 
fn(8) i J.lp(8) : fn(8) � L:i:1 2k .. Xp,.j;r(8) where 
X- k (8) = { 1, if J.lp(8) E [2k"' WJ; F, 2"' 0, otherwise. 
The above sequence of simple functions fn(8) are de­
fined on the normal net 1)* of (0, A, P) for n 2:: 1. The 
following transformation maps the binary order of the 
normal net to a decimal order. 
I' (' • ) kt::..(
. 2n-1 . 2n-2 . ) 1 '>: 11, ... ,Zn 1----+ = Z1· +z2· + . .  ·+Zn + ,  
where ( is one to one. Denote 
k 
Bkn) � u Dp(i) (k = 1, 
2, .. . , 2n), where p = (-1. 
i=1 
Then 
The sequence of simple functions fn(8) can be con­
structed using the following graph: 
2" 
G�) � U {Bkn) X {8IJ.lp(8) 2:: 2: }}. 
k=1 
e/ "', i. e. , for all e E e/ "', there are 
IIF(C) = Pl(0(C):::; Ple(C); 
N;.(C) = Bel (0 (C) 2:: Bele(C) 
for all c c e. Therefore D....., can be denoted as (o/ "'
· 
In addition, there is 
Proposition 3.1.7: For all w E 0, there is ((w) = 
e(w), where e(w) = e; e(w) . 
Theorem 3.1.8: If eo is the possibilistic evidence in 
the equivalent subclass induced from P, then for all e 
having the property J.le(8) = J.lp(8), 8 E e, there is 
Q;.(C) = Qe0(C) 2:: Q((C) 
for all c c e' where e is obtained from e through 
negating. Furthemore, we have the relation 
In some universe of discourse e, there exist two classes 
of concepts whose implications are antonymous to each 
other, e.g., {small, quite small, very small, extremely 
small, ... } versus {large, quite large, very large, ex­
tremely large, ... }. Given two concepts represented 
by two fuzzy subsets F1 and F2, if both F1 and F2 
510 Song and Liang 
belong to the same class of concepts, the two con­
cepts are said to be synonymous in implication, oth­
erwise, they are said to be antonymous in implica­
tion. We first select one of the two classes, e.g. , 
the class containing F1. We take a body of possi­
bilistic evidence 6 as the representation of F1, defin­
ing a set-valued mapping from (111,A1,Pl) to (B, B): 
6(w1) � Gj.Jw, : 111-+ Bas in Proposition 3.1.4. 
If F2 is synonymous to F1, define a set-valued map­
ping from (112,A2,P2) to (B, B), 6: 112-+ Bin the 
same way as 6, 6(w2) � Gj.Jw2• If F2 is antony-
- - � mous to F1, then we firstly take 6(w2) = G:f_/w2 as 
in Proposition 3.1.4, after negating (2 -+ (2 as in 
Proposition 3.1.5, 6(w2) = (2(w2) = Gj;Jw2 is ob-
tained, where G*; = (112 x 0)/G*;. From Theorem F2 _ F2 
3.1.6 and 3.1.8, 6 = (2 is also a body of possibilistic 
evidence. 
After making this classification, a series of interesting 
inference results can be obtained. In this paper, we 
only investigate the inference involving concepts which 
belong to either synonymous or antonymous classes as 
extreme cases. We believe that an appropriate selec­
tion of the universe of discourse can ensure the con­
cepts involved in inference to be limited to beloging 
to two classes which are antonymous in implication 
to each other. The rest of the concepts involved can 
be obtained through combination. We will investigate 
this topic in another papers. 
3.2 UNION AND INTERSECTION 
OPERATIONS, CORRELATION OF 
THE KNOWLEDGE INFORMATION 
SOURCES 
When two possibility propositions p 1 � X is F1, X E 
0 and P2 � X is F2, X E 0 are used to estimate 
the randomness of the values taken by the same 
language variable X, the results of union and in­
tersection operations are the estimation of random­
ness of the values the variable X takes induced 
by the union and intersection possibility proposi-
tions P12 � X is (F1 or F2), X E 0 and Pl.2 � 
X is (Fl and F2), X E 0, respectively. The two bod­
ies of possibilistic evidence el and 6 representing 
F1 and F2, respectively, should be considered as be­
ing defined on their own individual probability fields 
(111, A1, Pi) and (112, A2, P2) respectively. The two 
probability fields can be considered as two knowl­
edge information sources providing p1 and P2. Of 
course, there is a special case that (111> A1, Pi) and 
(112, A2, P2) are the same one. Therefore, the results 
of union and intersection operations, e12 � 6 v 6 and 
- � . 62 = e1 A6, should be defined on the combined prob-
ability field (111 X 112, Al X A2, p12), where 111 X 112 is 
the product sample space, A1 x A2 is the product u­
algebra and P12 is the combined probability measure. 
e12 and t12: 111 X 112 -+ B are obtained as follows: 
Definition 3.2.1: 6 : 111 -+ B and 6 : 112 -+ B are 
two set-valued mappings. Define 
� 
Ge,ve2 = {(w1,w2,B)I6(wl) U 6(w2) 3 B} 
and � Ge."e2 = {(w1,w2,B)I6(w1)ne2(w2) 3 B}. 
- � - � as graphs of 62 
= 
6 V6 and 62 = e1A6, respectively. 
Then 
e12(wl,w2) = Ge.v61·(wt,W2): 111x112-+B 
t12(wl,w2) = Ge,A61·(w,,w2) : 111 X n2-+ B 
are the union and intersection of 6 and 6, respec­
tively. The operations (6, 6)-+ e12 and (6, 6)-+ t12 
are called union and intersection respectively. 
The structure of the combined probability field affects 
the results of inference. Especially, different combined 
probability measure P12's produce different results of 
inference. First, we introduce the following definitions: 
Definition 3.2.2: Let Vi= {dln)} c V(111> A1) and 
V� = {d�n)} C V(112,A2) be the normal nets of 
(111,A1,Pl) and (112, A2,P2), respectively (see Def-
inition 2.10), where dln) = {D��! .. ;Jik = 0, 1; k = 
1, ... n} and d�n) = {DJ�� .. jJir = 0, 1; r = 1, ... n}. A 
combined net of (111 X 112, Al X A2, p12) is a division 
series Vh = {dl�)} c V(111 X 112,Al X A2) as follows: 
dl�) = {(D��! .. i,., DJ�� .. jJiik, ir = 0, 1; k, r = 1, ... n }, 
D��!_.i,. E A1, DJ�� .. j,. E A2, 
{( (1) )} (1) 1 p12 D;, ... i,.• 112 = P1(D;, ... iJ = 2n' 
{( (2) )} - ( (2) - 1 P12 111 , Dj. ... j,. - P2 Dj. ... jJ- 2n' 
(D��!..i,._,o, DJ�� .. j,._,o) U (D��! .. i,._10> DJ��--in-11)U 
D�
1) . D�
2
) . ) U (d1) . D\2) . ) t1•·•tn-11> J1•·•Jn-10 '1···•n-11> Jl··•Jn-11 
= (D��!_.;,._1,DJ�! .. j,._.), n = 1,2, ... 
It is apparent that for any n, there should be 
U (D��: .. i,.> DJ�� .. jJ = 111 x 112, 
il···in,il···in 
(D��!_.i,.' DJ�� .. jJ n (Dk�� .. k,.' D�;� .. rJ = 0, 
ifi1 ... in "# 
k1 . . .  kn or j1 ... jn "# r1 ... rn . 
The combined probability field (111 X 112, A1 X A2' Pd 
should also satisfy Assumption 2.11, i.e., it has its 
combined net Vi2, and A1 x A2 is sufficient to B. 
There are three specific combined probability measures 
P12 that are of particular interest: 
Definition 3.2.3: If for any n ;?: 1 and every element 
f d(n) 1)* {d(n) } o 12 E 12 = 12 ' 
ifi1 ... in = i1· · ·jn, 
otherwise; 
P12 is said to be positively correspondent and is de­
noted as P{;. 
. {( (1) (2) )} ( (1) ) ( (2) ) 2 1f P12 D. . D · · = P1 D · · P2 D · · ) Zt ... z.,> Jt .. ·Jn Zt ... Z,. )l .. . J,. 
P12 is said to be independent and is denoted as P{2 • 
{ 
1 
(1) (2) F> 3 if P12 D. · D· · = ) H .1 ...... , Jl ... Jn n 
0, 
if jk=l-ik, 
k = l, ... n, 
otherwise; 
P12 is said to be negatively correspondent and is de­
noted as Pi2· 
All the results of inference induced from Pi';, P{2 and 
P;2 will be denoted by +, I and -, e.g., J-tt"6 (B), 
K1(e1 V6), Bele1-e2(C), etc. All results without sup­
script represent those induced from other P{2s . 
The normal net of a probability field is a sequence of 
finer and finer subdivisions of this probability space. 
It induces an order on the sample space. The order is 
fixed according to Assumption 2.11. This order in­
duces an embedding of the sample space into the unit 
interval. Having two probability spaces of this kind, 
their normal nets define an embedding of the product 
sample space into the unit square. The measures P{;, 
P;2 and P{2 correspond to the uniform distribution 
on the main diagonal, the uniform distribution on the 
secondary diagonal, and the uniform distribution over 
the unit square, respectively. If we consider that the 
probability fields are the sources providing the knowl­
edge information, the way the combined probability 
is distributed reflects the correlation between the two 
information sources. If the information sources are 
individual experts, the correlation of the information 
sources then depends on the background, experience, 
personality, etc. of the experts. Considering the fuzzy 
subsets included in the possibility propositions as "soft 
constraints" on the values taken by the language vari­
able (X), the order imposed by the normal net on a 
probability field represents the degree of "tightness" or 
"looseness" of the soft constraints. For two concepts 
which are synonymous in implication, P{; implies that 
the opinions of the two experts on the degree of the soft 
constraints are similar, and P12 means that the opin­
ions are adversary, and vise versa for concepts which 
are antonymous in implication. Therefore, the correla­
tion of the knowledge information sources represented 
by the relation between the orders of constraints is the 
correlation of the experts' perception of the concepts. 
Based on this understanding, we have 
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Proposition 3.2.4: If 6 and 6 are induced from two 
concepts fft and F2 which are synonymous in implica­
tion, there is 
K-ce12);:::: K(e12);:::: K+ce12); 
and if e1 and 6 are antonymous in implication, the 
direction of the above inequalities should be reversed. 
Theorem 3.2.5: If K_(e12) = K+(e12) (then all 
K(e12) = constant.) and 6 and 6 are induced from 
two concepts F1 and F2 which are synonymous in im­
plication, there is 
Plb2(C);?: Ple12(C);?: Plt(C), 
Belb2(C) � Bele12(C) � Belt(C); 
for all c c e. If 6 and 6 are induced from two con­
cepts F1 and F2 which are antonymous in implication, 
the direction of the inequalities should be reversed. 
The logical implication of Theorem 3.2.5 is interest­
ing and agrees with intuition. A special case of P{; 
is that (i11,A1,P1) = (il2,A2,P2) which implies that 
the two knowledge information sources (the two ex­
perts) are the same one. In this case, the implication 
of Theorem 3.25 is obvious. 
The condition required in Theorem 3.2.5 is satisfi­
able, e.g., if either F1 or F2 is a normal fuzzy subset, 
there will be K-(e12) = K+(e12) = 1. 
Corollary 3.2.6: For concepts F1 and F1 which are 
synonymous in implication, there is 
J-t"'i (B);?: J-t< (0);?: J-tt (0) �12 �12 t,12 
for all () E e. And if F1 and F2 are antonymous in 
implication, the direction of the inequalities should be 
reversed. 
For the intersection operation e12 � 6 1\ 6, unfor­
tunately, there exists no similar relation like those in 
Proposition 3.2.4 and Theorem 3.2.5. However, 
we have: 
Theorem 3.2. 7: If e1 and e2 are induced from two 
concepts F1 and F2 which are synonymous in implica­
tion, there is 
Q"i (C)� Qc (C)� Qj (C); �12 �12 t,l2 
and for the two concepts which are antonymous to each 
other, the direction of the inequalities is reversed. 
Corollary 3.2.8: For two concepts F1 and F2 which 
are synonymous in implication, there is 
J-t"i (e)� J-t< (e)� J-tf (e), \12 \12 \12 
for all () E e. And if F1 and F1 are antonymous in 
implication, the direction of the inequalities should be 
reversed. 
The term in the center of all the above inequalities 
in the propositions and theorems includes the case in­
duced by P{2 as a special one. The case for more than 
two bodies of evidence will be discussed in another 
paper. 
512 Song and Liang 
3.3 CONDITIONING, EXTENDING OF 
THE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE 
A conditional inference proposition p12 � If X is F\, 
then y is F2, X E 81, y E 82 describes the logi­
cal relation between the two language variables X and 
Y. The two variables take their values in their own 
universes of discourse 81 and 82 (81 and 82 may 
be the same one). If 81 and 82 are different, the 
investigation should be made in the Cartesian prod­
uct of the two universes of discourse, 81 X 82, and a 
super-measurable structure (81 x 82,/31 x B2) should 
be constructed as in Definition 2.1. Then, accord­
ing to Definition 2.2, measurable random subsets 
(basic probability assignments) 6 : 01 -+ 81 X 82, 
6: 02-+ 81 X 82 and 62: 01 X 02-+ 81 X 82 can be 
defined. Assumption 2.11 becomes: the combined 
probability field (01 X 02, A1 X A2, p12) has its com­
bined net 'Dh and A1 x A2 is sufficient to 81 x 82 (and 
consequently, to 81 X 82 and to 81 X 82)· Lemma 
3.1.2 also holds for 
6(w!) = G61·wu 6(w2) = G61·w, 
and 62(w1,w2) = G62l·(w1,w2), 
where 
t::.. Ge,l·w, = {(01,02)1(w1,01,02) E Ge.}, 
Ge, E A1 x (81 x 82); 
t::.. Ge2l·w2 = {(01> 02)l(w2, 81, 82) E G6 }, 
Ge, E A2 X (81 X 82) 
and 
t::.. Ge,2l·(w,,w2) = {(Ol>02)I(w1,w2,01,02) E Ge,,}, 
Ge.2 E (A1 X A2) X (81 X 82), 
respectively. 
Suppose 6(w1) � Gff,,l -w, : 01 -+ 81 is the pos­
sibilistic evidence induced from a priori proposition 
P1 � X is F1, X E 81, where Gj. is the graph con­
structed as in 3.1. We define the following operation: 
Definition 3.3.1 Let Gt � {(wl>01,02)I(w1,0!) E 
Gj.,, 82 E 82}, then �"f(w1) � G{,l·w, : 01 -+ 81 x 82 is 
called the extending of 6 from 3(A1, B!) to 3(A1, 81 x 
82) (it is similar to the refining in (Shafer 1976)). 
After extending, the conditional proposition is trans­
fered into the product universe of discourse 81 X 
82, becoming Pl.2(X, Y) � If (X, Y) is {F\, 82), 
then (X, Y) is (81,F2), (X, Y) E 81x82, which indi­
cates the logical implication of the values taken by the 
two-dimensional language variable (X, Y). In the two­
dimensional universe of discourse 81 X 82, we can also 
consider the two extreme cases, i.e., two-dimensional 
concepts (F1, 82) and (81, F2) that are synonymous 
or antonymous in implication. For example, if the 
variables X and Y represent the height and weight of 
a person, respectively, then 81 � [Ocm, 300cm] and 
82 � [Okg, 200kg] are two different universes of dis­
course. The two dimensional concepts ("Quite Talf', 
82) and (81, "Heavy") may be considered as syn­
onymous in two-dimensional implication, while ("Very 
Short", 82) and (81, "Heavy") as antonymous in two­
dimensional implication. Therefore, the possibilistic 
evidence e� : 02 -+ 81 X 82, which representes the 
posterior proposition P2 � Y is F2, Y E 82, should 
be induced from 6(w2) � Gff,Jw2 : 02 -+ 82 through 
extending, i.e., e2(w2) � G{,l·w2, 
where G{, � {(w2, 81, 02)l(w2, 82) E Gj.2, 81 E 81}, 
if (Fl> 82) and (81, F2) are synonymous in two­
dimensional implication. If they are antonymous in 
two-dimensional implication, then e� : 02 -+ 81 X Bz 
should be induced from 6(w2) � G!.. 1 -w, : 02 -+ B2 F, 
through extending, i.e., e2(w2) � G�Jw,, 
-- 6. 
where G(2 = (02 X 81 X 82)/0(2 
= (02x81x82)/{(w2,01,02)I(w2,02) E Gj;.,,01 E 81}. 
Morever, the result of a conditional inference is a mea­
surable random subset from (01 X 02, A1 X A2, p12) 
- - - t::.. to (81 x 82,81 x 82). It is denoted as 62 = (e1 -+ 6) 
whose property also depends on the selection of the 
combined probability measure P12. 
The conditional inference proposition p12(X, Y) � 
If (X, Y) is (F1, 82), then (X, Y) is (81, F2), (X, Y) E 
81 X 82 and the union proposition .PJ'z(X, Y) � 
(X, Y) is not (F1, 82) or is (81, F2), (X, Y) E 81 X 
82 are equivalent each other. To represent the two­
dimensional fuzzy subset not(F1, 82), a body of pos-
sibilistic evidence ef(w!) � ae. 1-w, will be induced, 
-- t::.. where G{,l·w, = (01 X 81 X 82)/G{,. We have: 
Proposition 3.3.2: e�2 � (6 -+ 6) is a (measurable) 
random subset from (01 X 02, A1 X A2, p12) to (B1 X 
82, B1 X B2). If either F 1 or F2 is not an empty set, 
G_2 is a basic probability assignment. 
We have the following relations in two-dimension sim­
ilar to those in one dimension. 
Proposition 3.3.3: If (F1, 82) and (81, F2) are 
synonymous in two-dimensional implication, for all 
(81, 82) E 81 X 82, there is 
tJ"i ((81, 82))::; fJz ((81, 82))::; tJ"t ((81, 82)). '»12 "'12 "'12 
If (F1,82) and (81,F2) are antonymous in two­
dimensional implication, for all ( 01, 02) E 81 X 82, 
the direction of the inequalities should be reversed. 
The center term in the above inequalities includes 
fl� ((B1, B2)) as a special case. <,12 
Theorem 3.3.4: If either F\ or F2 are normal fuzzy 
subset and (F1,82) and (81,F2) are synonymous in 
two-dimensional implication, then 
Bel: (C) 2: Bel;; (C) 2: Bert (C); 62 <,12 -'2 
P l"i (C) :S Pl;; (C) :SPit (C) \,12 r.. 12 �12 
for all C C 01 x 02• If (F1,82) and (81,F2) are 
antonymous in two-dimensional implication, then the 
direction of the inequalities is reversed. The center 
term in the above inequalities includes Bel':. (C) and 62 
Pl� (C) as a special case. <,12 
The operation (6 ,  6)-+ 62 is defined as conditioning. 
The result of this operation, 62, represents the con­
ditional inference implication between the priori and 
posterior propositions P1 � X is F1 , X E 81 and 
/:;. . -P2 = Y 1s F2, , Y E 82. 
What are the implications of the different P12's? In the 
conditioning operation, there are two language vari­
ables X and Y taking their values under certain soft 
contraints provided by two fuzzy concepts F1 and F2• 
We can interpret that the P12 represents the relation 
between the two variables X and Y. In extreme cases, X and Y may be positively or negatively correlated, 
e.g., if X represents a specific person's weight and Y 
represents his fatness, then X and Y are positively 
correlative, P12 = Pit is positive correspondent; if X 
and Y represent the weight and thinness, then they 
are negatively correlated, P12 = Pi2 is negatively cor­
respondent. Based on this understanding, the logical 
implication of Theorem 3.3.4 is obvious. 
Note: X and Y may be the same language variable, 
el and 82 may be the same universe of discourse, all 
the propositions and theorems in Subsection 3.3 hold 
for these special cases. 
4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 POSSIBILITY INFERENCE AND 
PROBABILITY INFERENCE 
In Section 3, we constructed a unified framework 
for the inference with possibilistic evidence. On this 
framework, the inference is carried out as probability 
inference. In Zadeh's possibility theory, possibility in­
ference is carried out as fuzzy inference because possi­
bility is interpreted as compatibility with (fuzzy) con­
cepts. Many fuzzy inference operators were proposed 
for specific situations. On the framework developed in 
3, many fuzzy inference operators can be interpreted 
by taking different combined probability measures P12. 
We have 
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Proposition 4.1: For P{; , P{2 and Pt;, if F1 and F2 
are synonymous in implication, there are 
1) 
flt (B)= min{flel (B),fle2(B)} = flel(B)I\fle2(B). <,12 
These are Zadeh's union and intersection operators; 
2) flL(B) = fl6(B) + fle2(B)- fle1 (B)fle2(B); 
fli (B)= fl6 (B)fle,(B). <,12 
These are the probability sum and product operators in 
fuzzy inference; 
3) fl"i (B)= min{fl6((;1) + fl€2(B), 1}; <,12 
These are the bounded sum and bounded difference op­
erators in fuzzy inference. 
4) 
This is Lukasiewiez inference operator. 
5) 
This is the probability inference operator. 
6) 
This is Zadeh's conditional inference operator. 
If F1 and F2 are antonymous in implication, then fl+ 
should be changed to fl- (vise versa for fl-) in all the 
above equations. 
From Proposition 4.1, we can conclude that the pos­
sibility inference and the probability inference can be 
unified on our framewok. The inference discussed in 
Section 3 maintains both the compatibility of concepts 
and the consistency of probability logic. Especially, 
Belf11,6(C) and Plf1"e,(C) are the results by Demp­
ster's Rule of Combination. In addition we have 
Corollary 4.2: fltv/B) = 1 and flt"/B) = 0 for all 
BE tq. It means that_(eve)(w) = 0 and (tAe)(w) = 0, 
. - - - - + 1.e. F U F = 0 and F n F = 0, for P12. 
Because we consider P{; as positive correlation be­
tween the two knowledge information sources in (union 
and intersection) combination inference, including the 
case of the two sources being the same one, Corollary 
4.2 agrees with intuition. 
4.2 COMPATIBILITY WITH CONCEPTS 
AND IGNORANCE ON 
RANDOMNESS 
The membership function flp(B) = JLe(B) and the com­
monality number Qe(C) may be considered as the 
compatibility of the values taken by the language vari­
able X with the concept F. In our investigation of in­
ference, we have found that, in certain cases, the more 
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compatible with concepts the values the language vari­
able takes (i.e., the larger the membership function or 
the commonality number of the value taken by the 
variable), the less valuable the results obtained by in­
ference, and vise versa. For example, the intersection 
of two concepts F1 and F2, which are synonymous in 
implication and are provided by two negatively corre­
lated knowledge information sources, seems to be more 
valuable than that obtained from positively correlated 
sources, but we have Q-:: (C) $ Qi (C) for all C C 8 e12 '1" 
and J.l:: (0) $ J.lt (B) for all(} E e. Similar examples €12 . 6:� . . . . . can be found m almost all the mequahties m SectiOn 
3. Could we conclude that the smaller the member­
ship function (or commonality number) of a fuzzy set, 
the greater the information value it contains? Then, 
the empty set would contain the greatest information 
value. In the general sense, an emptyset does not con­
tain any useful information. This seems to be a para­
dox. The problem is how to measure the randomness 
information value of inference results. It is reason­
able that, the less the ignorence, the more valuable is 
the information on randomness. Therefore, the differ­
ence between Plausibility and Belief, Pl(C)- Bel( C), 
may be an approriate measure. This is suitable for 
union and conditioning operations and consistent with 
the concept of inclusion for random sets proposed by 
Dubois and Prade et al. (Dubois and Prade 1986, 
1991; Yager 1986; Delgado and Moral 1987). However, 
it is not suitable for intersection operation. From a 
measure theory viewpoint, the belief function may be 
considered as an inner measure, and the plausibility 
function may be considered as an outer measure. In 
the case of the possibilistic evidence, these measures 
are induced by the constraints J.le(B) = J.li'(B), (} E 8. 
This view provides an interesting connection with the 
measurability of subsets. Some researchers have paid 
attention to this topic, e.g. (Fagin and Halpern 1991). 
We believe that the measurability of a subset (propo­
sition) is closely related to the grain size or resolution 
of the properties specifying the subsets. 
4.3 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF 
INFERENCE 
It is difficult to determine the correlation between 
the knowledge information sources. It is also diffi­
cult to determine whether concepts are synonymous or 
antonymous in their implicat,ions. In spite of these, the 
inequalities obtained in Section 3 provide the bounds 
of inference results (Note: Even when two concepts 
cannot be determined to be synonymous or antony­
mous in implication, inequalities similar to those in 
Section 3 can be obtained with a little revision, i.e., 
the bounds on inference results still hold). Proba­
bility inference, especially, the combination inference 
for evidence (e.g., using Dempster's Rule of Combi­
nation), usually has a high computational complexity. 
To carry out the combination in an infinite universe 
of discourse, the amount of computation needed tends 
to grow exponentially with the accuracy required. It 
would be impossible to complete such logical inference 
of combination in practice. However, determination 
of Pt, and P;2 is much easier and the complexity of 
computation is much lower if Pt, and P;2 are used to 
combine 6 and 6. We believe that Pt, and Pi2 may 
give the lower and upper bounds (or vise versa) of the 
combination results of the other P12's. It may prob­
ably provide a new technique to the development of 
fast inference mechanism with possibilistic evidence. 
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